I didn’t expect that China suddenly launched a heavy attack on the Internet giants in China. In recent years, the oligarchy, monopoly and closeness of Internet giant companies have been criticized all the time. This kind of big shop bullying is finally over! In order to prevent and stop monopoly behavior in the economic field of Internet platform, reduce the cost of administrative law enforcement and operators’ compliance, strengthen and improve the anti-monopoly supervision in the field of platform economy, protect fair market competition, safeguard consumers’ interests and social public interests, and promote the sustained and healthy development of the platform economy, according to the anti monopoly law of the people’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as “the anti monopoly law of the people’s Republic of China” (hereinafter referred to as《 Anti monopoly law) to formulate this guide. < p > < p > 2. The platform referred to in this guide is the Internet platform. It refers to the business organization form in which interdependent multilateral entities interact under the rules and matchmaking provided by specific carriers through network information technology, so as to jointly create value. According to the provisions of Article 18 and Article 19 of the anti monopoly law, the anti-monopoly law enforcement agency analyzes the factors and circumstances that determine or presume that the operator has a dominant market position. Combined with the characteristics of platform economy, the following factors can be considered specifically: < / P > < p > (1) the market share of operators and the relevant market competition situation. To determine the market share of operators in the field of platform economy, we can consider the proportion of transaction amount, transaction quantity, number of users, hits, usage time or other indicators in the relevant market, as well as the duration of the market share. (2) the ability of operators to control the market. We can consider the operator’s ability to control the upstream and downstream markets, the ability to hinder and influence other operators to enter the relevant market, the business model of relevant platforms, network effect, and the ability to influence or determine Commission, flow or other trading conditions. It is impossible for operators to dominate the market at a high price or to dominate the market at a low price. To analyze whether it constitutes an unfair high price or an unfair low price, the following factors can be considered: < / P > < p > (1) whether the price is significantly higher or significantly lower than the price of the same commodity or comparable commodity of operators in other platform economic fields under the same or similar market conditions; < / P > < p > (2) whether the price is significantly higher or significantly lower than that of the platform economy The price of the same commodity or comparable commodity in other regions with the same or similar market conditions. < / P > < p > (3) under the condition of basically stable cost, whether the operator in the economic field of the platform increases the sales price or reduces the purchase price beyond the normal range; < / P > < p > (4) whether the price increase of the operator in the economic field of the platform is obviously high Whether the increase of cost or the price reduction of purchased goods is obviously lower than that of cost reduction. < / P > < p > platform operators with a dominant market position may abuse the dominant market position and sell goods at a price lower than the cost without justifiable reasons to exclude and restrict market competition. In the analysis of whether it constitutes sales below cost, the focus is generally on whether the platform operators crowd out other platform operators with competitive relationship at a price lower than the cost, and whether they increase the price and make improper profits after excluding other platform operators from the market. < / P > < p > the operators in the field of platform economy with market dominant position may abuse the dominant position of the market, restrict the transaction of the counterpart without justifiable reasons, and exclude and restrict the market competition. The following factors can be taken into consideration in analyzing whether it constitutes a restricted transaction or not: < / P > < p > to analyze whether it constitutes a restricted transaction, we can focus on the following two situations: first, the restrictions imposed by platform operators through punitive measures such as search rights reduction, flow restriction, technical barriers, and deposit deduction, which cause direct damage to market competition and consumers’ interests, can generally be identified as constituting Limited trading behavior. < / P > < p > the second is that the restrictions imposed by platform operators through incentives such as subsidies, discounts, concessions, and flow resource support may have a positive effect on the interests of operators, consumers and the overall social welfare of the platform. However, if there are obvious exclusion and restriction effects on market competition, they may also be identified as restricted trading behavior. < / P > < p > the operators in the field of platform economy with market dominant position may abuse the dominant position of the market, implement tying or attach unreasonable trading conditions without justifiable reasons, so as to exclude and restrict market competition. The following factors can be taken into consideration in analyzing whether it constitutes a tie-in or an unreasonable transaction condition is attached: < / P > < p > (1) different commodities are bundled for sale by means of format terms, pop-up windows, necessary steps of operation, etc., which cannot be selected, changed or rejected by the trading counterpart; < / P > < p > operators in the field of platform economy with market dominant position may abuse market domination Status, without justifiable reasons, to implement differential treatment to the trading counterparts with the same trading conditions, to exclude and restrict market competition. The following factors can be taken into consideration in analyzing whether it constitutes a differential treatment: < / P > < p > (1) based on big data and algorithms, according to the payment ability, consumption preference and usage habits of the transaction counterpart, the differential transaction price or other transaction conditions shall be implemented; < / P > < p > the draft emphasizes that “the concentration of operators involving the vie structure belongs to the operator set The scope of China’s anti-monopoly review. If the concentration of business operators meets the declaration standards prescribed by the State Council, the business operators shall report to the anti monopoly law enforcement agency of the State Council in advance, and those who fail to declare shall not be concentrated. ” < / P > < p > for the concentration of operators in the field of platform economy that fails to meet the declaration standards, if it has or may have the effect of excluding or restricting competition, and meets the following circumstances, the antimonopoly law enforcement agency of the State Council will investigate and deal with it according to law: the operators participating in the concentration are start-ups and emerging platforms; the operators participating in the concentration are caused by the free or low-cost mode Low turnover; high concentration of relevant market and less competitors; other situations that have or may have the effect of excluding or restricting competition.
according to the website of the State Administration of market supervision, November 6th, the three departments of the General Administration of market supervision, the central network office and the State Administration of Taxation jointly held the executive Guidance Committee on regulating the online economic order. Jingdong, the US group, 58 cities, Baidu, Qihoo 360, Sogou, byte beating, Kwai Chi, Didi, micro shop, Sina micro-blog, multi-point, shell search room, and many countries. 27 major Internet platform enterprises, including meionline, hungry Mo, xiaohongshu, Ctrip Suning, Tongcheng, Alibaba, Beibei, Yunji, mushroom street, Xingsheng optimization, vipshop and Tencent, attended the meeting. < p > < p > the meeting made severe criticism on forcing businesses to “choose one from two” and brush off reviews, and put forward nine clear requirements, such as Internet platform should not abuse its dominant position in the market. < / P > < p > “choose one from two” has never been a new phenomenon. From last year’s Galanz lawsuit against tmall to this year’s dispute between vipshop and AI stock, the phenomenon of “choosing one from two” can be said to be “pressing the gourd to float the ladle”. Especially in the overall environment of slowing down the growth of Internet users and the flow entering the stock age, the competition of e-commerce and other Internet platforms on business brands and user traffic will only become more intense. < / P > < p > according to sina science and technology, although big data hacking was banned from October 1, Ms. Han in Beijing suffered from big data hacking some time ago. On October 16, when she was shopping on an e-commerce platform, she mistakenly used another mobile phone to check out. Unexpectedly, there was an unexpected discovery, the difference of 25 yuan between different accounts of the same mobile phone. < p > < p > clearly, it is the same product of the same business. Ms. Han bought it with the senior member account that she often used and had been “old” for 12 years. Actually, it was 25 yuan more than her other ordinary account which only had more than five years. According to Ms. Han, her senior member account has already spent nearly 260000 yuan, while her ordinary account is only 2400 yuan. < p > < p > in order to prevent and stop the monopoly behavior in the economic field of Internet platform, reduce the cost of administrative law enforcement and operators’ compliance, strengthen and improve the anti-monopoly supervision in the field of platform economy, protect fair market competition, safeguard consumers’ interests and social public interests, and promote the sustained and healthy development of platform economy, according to the anti monopoly law of the people’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as “anti trust”) The guidelines are formulated. (1) create a fair competition order. Efforts should be made to prevent and stop monopoly behaviors that exclude and restrict competition, maintain a fair and open and inclusive development environment in the field of platform economy, reduce market entry barriers, promote more subjects to enter the market, participate in competition fairly and orderly, and stimulate market vitality. (2) strengthen scientific and effective supervision. The basic system, regulatory principles and analytical framework of the anti-monopoly law are applicable to all market entities in the field of platform economy. The anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies will strengthen competition analysis and legal argumentation, continuously strengthen and improve anti-monopoly supervision, and enhance the pertinence and scientificity of anti-monopoly law enforcement according to the development status, development law and own characteristics of the platform economy. (3) stimulate innovation and creativity. We should maintain fair competition in the field of platform economy, guide and encourage platform operators to use more resources for technological innovation, quality improvement, service improvement and model innovation, prevent and stop exclusion and restriction of competitive behaviors, inhibit the development of economic innovation and economic vitality of the platform, effectively stimulate the innovation and creativity of the whole society, and build new advantages and new driving forces for economic and social development. (4) promote the healthy development of the industry. Through anti-monopoly supervision, we will maintain fair and orderly competition in the field of platform economy, give full play to the role of platform economy in efficiently matching supply and demand, reducing transaction costs, and developing potential markets, so as to promote the optimization of resource allocation, technological progress and efficiency improvement, and support and promote the development of the real economy. (5) safeguard the legitimate interests of all parties. The development of platform economy involves many subjects. While protecting fair market competition, protecting and promoting the development of the platform, antitrust supervision focuses on safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of operators, consumers and other parties in the platform, so that the whole society can share the technological progress and economic development achievements of the platform, and realize the overall ecological harmonious coexistence and healthy development of the platform economy. < / P > < p > < p > (1) platform. The platform referred to in this guide is an Internet platform. It refers to a business organization form in which interdependent multilateral entities interact under the rules and matchmaking provided by specific carriers through network information technology, so as to jointly create value. < / P > < p > (3) platform operators refer to the operators who provide business places, transaction matching, information exchange and other Internet platform services to natural persons, legal persons and other market entities. < p > < p > platform economy involves multi-party entities, complex business types, and dynamic competition. To define the relevant commodity market and regional market in the field of platform economy, we need to follow the general principles set by the anti monopoly law and the guidelines of the anti monopoly Commission of the State Council on the definition of relevant markets, and take into account the characteristics of the platform economy and make a specific analysis in combination with individual cases. < / P > < p > platform