On September 11, 2020, China Express submitted a prospectus to the Hong Kong stock exchange, and it was rumored that it would raise US $2 billion. Goldman Sachs (Asia) acts as the sole sponsor, Deloitte (Guan Huang Chen Fang) acts as the auditor, and fullerte law firm acts as the exclusive legal adviser. Zhongtong, Yuantong, Shentong, Baishi (formerly Huitong) and Yunda are collectively referred to as “four links and one Da”. In 2008, he took a stake in Baishi (at that time, the rookie had not yet been established). He invested in Yuantong in 2015 and held Zhongtong in 2018. In July 2019, he signed a share purchase agreement with Shentong’s shareholders. In December 2019, Alibaba acquired 2% of Yunda’s equity through block trading in the secondary market. Ali spent 12 years to gather “Tongda system”. < p > < p > since 2015, Shentong, Yuantong, Shunfeng and Yunda have been listed on the backdoor of a shares. Zhongtong and Baishi went to NYSE, and Zhongtong became the largest IPO in the US capital market in 2016. < / P > < p > in 2019, with 12.1 billion pieces of business volume and 19.1% market share, China Express ranked first in China’s express enterprises and was the representative of “Tongda Department”. < / P > < p > in 2019, the market share of the top five of the six express giants will increase significantly, with more than 10% of the total, and more than 80% in total. Industry concentration will be further improved, track congestion, small and medium-sized players may be squeezed off the cliff or be swallowed up by giants. < / P > < p > in 2019, Zhongtong’s business volume reached 12.1 billion pieces, with a market share of 19.1%, an increase of 2.3 percentage points compared with that in 2018; the business volume of Yunda exceeded 10 billion pieces, with a year-on-year growth of 43.6%, and a market share of 15.8%, 2% higher than that of 2018; Shentong’s business volume increased by 44.2%, ranking the first in the industry, with a market share of 11.6%, 1.6% higher than that in 2018, which is close to Baishi. The number of express delivery companies in China will be more than 3 billion in 2020. Zhongtong and Baishi have already “hit the line” ahead of time, and Yuantong’s business volume is likely to reach 10 billion yuan in 2020. The main driving force for the growth of express delivery business volume is e-commerce. According to the data of the National Bureau of statistics, among the 41 trillion total retail sales of consumer goods in 2019, the total retail sales of physical goods will reach 8.5 trillion, accounting for 20.7%. Moreover, the year-on-year growth rate reached 19.5%, far higher than the growth rate of total retail sales of social goods (8% in 2019). < / P > < p > the saying that “express delivery relies heavily on e-commerce” means putting the cart before the horse. If a person’s annual salary is 200000 yuan, he will enter company a with his annual salary of 1 million yuan. Others pointed out that he was heavily dependent on company A. I believe many people want to rely on company A. < p > < p > take a poor county with beautiful mountains and clear waters as an example. Its annual fiscal revenue is only 2 billion, and the fiscal revenue from tourism development reaches 10 billion. How many steel mills and cement plants should be built to get rid of dependence? The retail sales of physical goods account for one fifth of the total retail sales of social goods, and there is still a lot of room for growth. Express companies and commodity sales platforms are partners of e-commerce ecology, with different division of labor, interdependence and mutual achievement. < / P > < p > in 2019, the revenue of China express industry was 749.8 billion yuan, the business volume was 63.5 billion units, and the average unit price was 11.8 yuan, a year-on-year decrease of 0.9%, 7.1% lower than that of 2016. The proportion of e-commerce business in 2019 increased by 10.8% compared with 2016. It can be said that the impact of the rapid growth of e-commerce business on the decline of express business ticket price is far less than imagined. The unit price of SF ticket is much higher than the average level of the industry, and has become loose in recent years (especially in the first half of 2020). In 2018 and 2019, they were 23.3 yuan and 21.9 yuan respectively. Due to the direct marketing mode, SF has been able to recognize the high fees in full as revenue, and the revenue of express delivery business will reach 106 billion yuan in 2019. < / P > < p > in this mode, the collection outlets collect express fees from users. After deducting the income from collection, the payment submitted to the express platform includes face-to-face bill fee (which is essentially information service fee), material fee, transfer fee and delivery fee. Express companies are responsible for information services, and the powerful ones are responsible for the transit and trunk transportation, and the delivery fee is obtained from the receiving customer’s network. < / P > < p > income is obtained in the form of face-to-face fees. Specifically, express companies collect customer and mail related information through the face sheet, and then use electronic information technology to locate and query the whole process of express service. < / P > < p > the face sheet is the only “ID card” of each piece, and the barcode on it is scanned successively in the links of collection, transfer and delivery. Only by pasting the above list, the package received can enter the transit system of the express company and finally be delivered. < / P > < p > the timeliness and processing capacity of transit are the core capabilities of express companies, which are equivalent to the “waist” of a person. A man with a bad waist can neither run fast nor carry weight. < / P > < p > Zhongtong is the latest one in the Tongda system. The important reason for its rapid rise is that it took the lead in opening inter provincial shuttle bus and transfer center, and gradually transferred its transit business from outsourcing to direct operation. Nowadays, the necessity of “transit direct marketing” has become the industry consensus. < / P > < p > this is because Zhongtong does not regard the delivery fee as revenue as the other five express companies do. The reason is “we act as an agent for last mile delivery services”. Zhongtong’s accounting treatment is more reasonable, but it is accused of “sitting on expenses” by unscrupulous American speculators and thus shorting. < p > < p > < p > Yunda “follows the good as the stream”, and will recognize the delivery fee as revenue (accounting for 48.6%) since 2019. In 2019, the revenue of each business will reach 3.2 yuan, a strong increase of 85% over the same period of last year. Excluding the delivery fee, Yunda’s revenue per ticket decreased by 4.9% year on year. < p > < p > SF adopts the direct marketing mode. Zhongtong does not include the delivery fee into the revenue. Baishi and Yuantong have not disclosed details. Only from the financial report data of Yunda and Shentong, can we see the composition of the average single ticket income of express under the franchise mode. < p > < p > in 2019, the single ticket revenue of Yunda and Shentong is 3.19 yuan and 3.11 yuan respectively, with a difference of 8 cents. Excluding the distribution income, the single ticket income of Yunda and Shentong decreased by 0.08 yuan and 0.17 yuan respectively compared with that in 2018. < p > < p > in 2019, the paid delivery fee of Shentong was 0.16 yuan higher than that of Yunda; the transfer charge of Shentong also charged 4 cents more; however, the single fee of Yunda noodle was as high as 0.73 yuan, which was 0.32 yuan higher than Shentong, which was 78% higher. < p > < p > < p > in essence, the sales of face-to-face orders are information service charges. In 2019, the utilization rates of Yunda and Shentong electronic face sheets will reach 99.63% and 99.55% respectively. < p > < p > from the perspective of revenue structure of Yunda express and Shentong express, there are many reasons for the decline of single ticket income. Yunda has reduced the transfer fee and Shentong has reduced the face-to-face single fee. < p > < p > for SF, which adopts the direct marketing mode, the ticket income is far higher than the industry average level, but the cost is also very high. In 2018 and 2019, the gross profit margin was less than 18%. < p > < p > although the single ticket income plummeted to 18.4 yuan, 5.2 yuan or 22.1% lower than that of H1 in 2019, the gross profit margin miraculously increased by 1.3 percentage points to 18.7%. The final non net profit was 3.445 billion, up 47.8% year on year; the net profit margin was 4.8%, 1 percentage point higher than that of H1 in 2019. < p > < p > coincidentally, in 2020, the business volume of China Unicom will rise sharply and the income of single ticket will decrease. In the first half of the year, the business volume of express delivery was 6.97 billion, with a year-on-year increase of 29.8%; the single ticket income was 1.28 yuan, a year-on-year decrease of 22%. Founded in 2002, Zhongtong is the youngest member of Tongda department. In 2005, China Telecom took the lead in operating inter provincial bus service and opened the first “transit direct marketing”. Different from SF, China Telecom does not engage in direct marketing, and the franchisees are responsible for the collection and delivery of goods. Instead, it invests heavily in the sorting and trunk transportation links to establish direct marketing. The advantages of the two modes are both inclusive. < / P > < p > from the perspective of business structure, Zhongtong is almost “a company specialized in collecting transfer fees”. In 2019, Zhongtong’s business volume reached 12.1 billion, and the transfer fee income was 7.47 billion, accounting for 83.5% of the express business income. The transfer fee income per order is 1.4 yuan, which is much higher than other members of Tongda. < / P > < p > in 2019, the single ticket transfer cost (including trunk transportation, sorting and others) of China Telecom is about 1 yuan, and the gross profit margin of transit business is close to 28.6%. In H1 2020, the single ticket transfer fee of China Telecom will be reduced to 1.07 yuan. However, due to the drop of oil price and other factors, the single ticket transfer cost will also drop to 0.79 yuan, and the gross profit margin of transit business will still be 26.1%. Among the other members of Tongda, only Yunda and Shentong disclosed the income and cost of transit business. In 2019, the revenue and cost of Yunda single ticket transfer business are 0.91 yuan and 1.09 yuan respectively, with a gross loss rate of 20.3%; Shentong is slightly better, and the income and cost of single ticket transfer business in 2019 are 0.95 yuan and 1.03 yuan, with a gross loss rate of 9.1%. < p > < p > Shunfeng all direct marketing, Zhongtong “transfer direct marketing”. In addition, a few “transfer to direct marketing” still need a large amount of investment. Life will not be easy, but it seems that they can “survive”. Global Tech