Momo has been in trouble for some time. As of the first half of 2020, Momo’s revenue showed two consecutive quarters of negative growth, including the previous four consecutive quarters of decline in growth, stall has been more than a year. Based on the closing market value of US $2.918 billion on September 28 (the same below), it has evaporated by more than 70% compared with the record high of more than US $10 billion reached in June 2018. Why is the once coveted hormonal business not so good when it comes to strangers as a social leader? What are the challenges facing this once new favorite of the Internet? Can stall decline be reversed? < p > < p > founded in 2011, Momo created a precedent for strangers to socialize in China, attracting nearly 70 million months of life in just three years, and successfully landed on NASDAQ. However, at that time, Momo was similar to many Chinese stocks, but it was impossible to realize the huge number of users. Even in the year of listing, it also lost 25.42 million yuan. < p > < p > < p > the ZHENGJING society found that Momo, after listing in 2014, has used a series of means such as online leisure games, increasing advertising, opening member services to reverse losses, but with little effect. Until 2015, Momo achieved annual profit for the first time after trying to live broadcast. < p > < p > since then, Momo has completed its transformation to a live broadcasting company, although it shows people in the face of strangers’ social contact. Since Q3, 2016, the live broadcast revenue has exceeded half of Momo’s total revenue. From Q1, 2017 to Q2, 2018, the revenue accounted for more than 80% in six consecutive quarters. < / P > < p > different from the fierce game live broadcast in the market, Momo’s live broadcast is more often seen in the show of “big men reward beautiful girls”. The sexy figure on the screen is easy to impress young men, and let them constantly take out the scattered silver, and then put all the gifts flying across the screen into the stranger’s pocket. < p > < p > the simple and crude business model makes Momo earn a lot of money. From the first profit of 13.7 million yuan in 2015 to 2.971 billion yuan in 2019, the compound annual growth rate of momogui’s net profit has reached an astonishing nearly 300% in the past five full fiscal years. < / P > < p > in 2018, after Momo released the first quarter report of revenue and net profit doubling year on year, the company’s share price reached 52.86 US dollars per share, the market value exceeded 10 billion US dollars, and the P / E ratio reached 34 times. If you are lucky enough to participate in Momo’s new campaign at the end of 2014, in three and a half years, your stock’s floating profit has exceeded 310%. < / P > < p > the network moat built by a large number of users, coupled with the realization of profitability and stable doubling of performance, has made Momo a new favorite of the Internet industry. < / P > < p > since its profit was made in 2015, Momo’s revenue and net profit to its mother show a high growth trend, which makes people mistakenly believe that the Chinese version of Facebook is being born. However, history tells us that trees do not grow to the sky. < p > < p > < p > according to ZHENGJING society, in the second quarter of 2018, the year-on-year growth of Momo app fell below 20% for the first time, and then it was out of control. In the second quarter of 2019, the year-on-year growth rate fell below 10%, and in the fourth quarter of 2019, the monthly life almost stopped. < / P > < p > in the fourth quarter of 2018, the growth rate of paid users of momoapp exceeded 20% for the first time, and then only two quarters later, the growth rate of paying users stopped. According to the calculation, in the second quarter of 2020, the number of paid users of momoapp is 8.9 million, which is only equivalent to the level in the third quarter of 2018. < / P > < p > the sluggish growth of active users and paying users directly affects Momo’s performance. In the fourth quarter of 2018, Momo’s revenue returned to the normal level of 50% of the industry. In the same period, the net profit of the parent company only recorded a single digit growth, and the myth of high growth was shattered. < p > < p > What’s more, in the next full fiscal year, the year-on-year growth rate of Momo’s income fell again from 35% to 22%, and in the first half of this year, there were two consecutive quarters of negative growth. Not only did the tree not grow to the sky, but also went to the other extreme. < / P > < p > in China, the competition in the Internet application market is very fierce. Renren, which was popular in the post-80s college period, disappeared within a few years. Last year, Chen Yizhou, founder of renren.com, said in an online public discussion on the decline of renren.com: “we made a lot of attempts from 2011 to 2015, because of our own ability problems and many uncontrollable external factors, we failed to resist the pressure of wechat.” In short, the failure of Renren mainly comes from the rise of wechat. The current Mo Mo, have you met the wechat in Renren such an opponent? < / P > < p > if we only look at the social field of strangers, Momo’s position as the leader of subdivision is still stable, but as we mentioned earlier, Momo is essentially a live show company. Once the attribute changes, it is not difficult to find that Momo’s dilemma is comparable to that of Renren. < / P > < p > in 2018, two short video apps broke out one after another, which ravaged the domestic Internet application market with the trend of seizing cities and dominating the territory. They not only robbed a large number of active users, but also launched a sneak attack on the money bags of relevant Internet companies by developing diversified cashing methods of live broadcast and e-commerce. < p > < p > as one of the two major game live broadcasting platforms in China, the proportion of live broadcast of tiger tooth show is also the highest. In the nearly nine quarters of Q2 in 2020, the overall Mau of Huya (including mobile terminal) began to decline year-on-year, except that q1-q2 in 2019 benefited from shuffling growth of live broadcasting industry. < / P > < p > although the monthly activity of tiger teeth reached a new high of 168 million in the second quarter of this year, the growth of other short videos was more prominent. Figures released by Tang Yuyu, the head of fast game August, show that in May this year, the active users of the live Kwai live game were over 220 million, and the short game video users were breaking 300 million, and the half Kwai street was left.
tiger teeth month activity is quickly overturned by Kwai Fu, which can reflect the changing track of the entire live broadcast industry competition environment. For Momo, who mainly bet on live show, the impact of short video live broadcast on its show live broadcast is no less than that of game live broadcast. Tiktok tiktok:
if you are a veteran game player, you can easily find that the Shanghai anchor’s voice is the same as the anchor’s live broadcast. But unlike the unfamiliar street, there are more active users and anchors on the jitter, and the network effect built by them is not in a tiktok. < / P > < p > moreover, the Internet is also a winner take all field. The huge network effect and head concentration trend of short video platform make it difficult for Momo to reverse the current predicament, unless it can effectively change the business model in which the income is highly dependent on live broadcasting. Therefore, in the short term, the negative growth of Momo’s monthly living and income caused by the special stage of the epidemic may be remedied, but the slowdown of Momo is difficult to reverse. < / P > < p > as a tool, the Internet itself is neutral and has no value choice. However, the values it outputs to the audience mainly come from the people who operate the Internet tools, which is also the reason why Google emphasizes that it does not do evil. < p > < p > < p > according to ZHENGJING society, Momo has been honored by some netizens as a “weapon of appointment” because of the pornographic trading information on its software platform and a large number of sexual assault cases. < p > < p > as early as 2014, a reporter from xinhuanet.com reported that Momo was “a tool for making friends, a tool for sexual intercourse, aggravating prostitution, sexual assault and other illegal and criminal acts”. However, after six years, Momo is still one of the main communication tools of peach blossom incidents. < p > < p > in June of this year, Jihuo technology revealed that: according to incomplete statistics, in the past six months, there were as many as 12 cases of sexual assault caused by strangers, including two young girls. Of course, regulators have not stood idly by. On April 28, 2019, the relevant departments forced another social software probe app of Momo off the shelves in major application markets with suspicion of spreading obscenity and other illegal information, resulting in the fluctuation of Momo’s income. < / P > < p > in addition to the risk of policy, the “vicious” events constantly staged also make it difficult for Momo to remove the negative label, which leads to a large escape of users. There are traces of this around us. When a friend hears that you are using “Mo Mo” or “probe”, he will probably cast a different look at you. At the same time, this kind of negative influence also gave birth to the rise of other strangers’ social platforms. Take soul, a stranger social product recommended based on mind matching and algorithm, as an example. Since the product was launched in September 2015, the number of active people has increased by leaps and bounds, and it has successively received two rounds of financing, and has become a formidable opponent of Momo. The second effect of negative tags is that it accelerates the migration speed of platform traffic. Strangers’ social products themselves have the limitation of “making wedding clothes for others” – users who chat about their feelings on strangers will transfer this relationship to acquaintance social platforms such as wechat and QQ. Malignant events are accelerating this trend. < / P > < p > in this way, Momo’s existing monthly live and user usage time growth will be further affected, and other cash means used by the platform to disperse the live broadcast income, such as value-added services, will be affected by the migration of users. < / P > < p > the star zhonggai stock, which once had a market value of more than 10 billion yuan, has never been able to get rid of the status quo of income dependence on live broadcasting. Under the strong attack of short video, the decline is difficult to reverse. In addition to the continuous “evil” events, the platform is difficult to remove the negative label to further accelerate the pace of traffic migration, and now Momo seems to have stepped into the trough again. As of September 28, Momo’s closing price was $13.96/share, almost falling down from the IPO price of $13.5/share in 2014. At present, the dynamic P / E ratio of about 7 times is not like an Internet company. In terms of market value, Momo’s current market value is less than US $2.9 billion, which is more than US $10 billion on June 11, 2018, and evaporation is more than 70%. As of June 31, the book value of the company is 13.9 billion yuan, which means that the current premium is only about 6 billion yuan. Compared with peers, its valuation reflects a certain degree of cheapness. < / P > < p > is the market value trough caused by Momo stall the golden pit of short-term bad luck or the value trap of long-term recession of the company? This depends on the performance of the next, “ZHENGJING she” will continue to pay attention to it. Didi Qingju bicycle has entered 150 cities